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“Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been 
positively harmful to most people.”1 
 
“A theoretical approach with no place for a theory of power is not merely 
deeply deficient but actively pernicious, because mystifying.”2 
 
“[E]fficiency . . . is . . . not an economic concept, though it’s called that.  
It’s really an ideological concept.  And, you know, we all know it.”3 
                                                
 * B.A. Columbia College, Columbia University; M.A. University of Virginia; J.D. 
University of Virginia School of Law.  The author is the owner of Crawford Tax Law Group, 
PC, a tax controversy firm in Los Angeles.  His blog on critical theory and the law can be 
found at http://lawcrit.com/.  The author would like to thank Jamie Boyle, Noam Chomsky, 
Ha-Joon Chang, Terry Eagleton, Duncan Foley, David Cay Johnston, Benjamin McKean, 
Richard Wolff, and Larry Zelenak for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
 1. HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM 248 (2010) 
(“[E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant.  Economics, as it has been practiced in the last 
three decades, has been positively harmful for most people.”). 
 2. RAYMOND GEUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND REAL POLITICS 94 (2008). 
 3. Joe Friendly, Noam Chomsky, Corporate Attack on Education at St. Philip’s Church of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The Basic Argument 
 
This Article argues that the pro-consumption tax literature is wrong to 
claim that no legitimate fairness objections to the consumption tax exist.4  It 
                                                                                                               
Harlem, YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2012), at 53:55, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
DbMP-cy1INA (copy on file with author).  To readers who might find this statement jarring, 
let me elaborate.  Here, Chomsky is speaking about the corporatization of the educational 
system and mocking the notion of efficiency more generally.  To illustrate this point, he uses 
the example of how the automation of customer service calls has been called “efficient” when 
this just means, as we have all experienced, putting the costs as much as possible on the 
consumer, on the public.  Chomsky also debunks the notion of efficiency in the context of 
high technology  (e.g., iPhones, the Internet, and automation).  As he remarks, the actual value 
of such trumped technology is in its employment to increase the power and control of the 
ownership class over the rest of the population.  See NOAM CHOMSKY, HOPES AND PROSPECTS 
88 (2010) (“Within the state sector the technology [manufacturing technology during the 
Reagan administration] was designed in a specific way: to de-skill workers and enhance 
management control.  That choice was not inherent in the technology and does not appear to 
have become more profitable.”); see also Freigeist 20789, Noam Chomsky – For a Free 
Humanity, YOUTUBE (Jan. 13, 2011), at 15:00–27:00, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=CozeSgbKRI4 [hereinafter Humanity].  As Chomsky explains:  
Automation . . . was highly inefficient and could not be developed through 
the market so it had to be developed through the state sector.  We have a 
huge state sector of the economy here.  It’s called the Pentagon.  And its 
purpose is to protect rich people from market discipline. . . .  Automation    
. . . was developed . . . through the Airforce, the Navy, and so on . . . .  
Automation was in fact designed specifically to deskill workers and to add 
levels of management. . . .  [V]ery useful for class struggle.  
Id. at 25:20–27:16.  Chomsky’s position finds support in other analyses.  See, e.g., Interview 
by Jayne O’Donnell with David Cay Johnston, Author, The Fine Print: How Big Companies 
Use ‘Plain English’ to Rob You Blind (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/CayJo (discussing how telco companies use power to extort rents to 
create a system where U.S. consumers pay the highest price for the lowest levels of internet 
service in the developed world); CHANG, supra note 1, at 36, 31, 157 (noting that the washing 
machine was far more revolutionary than the Internet in economic terms and that a bus driver 
in India is much more productive than any Silicon Valley “entrepreneur”); JULIAN ASSANGE, 
CYPHERPUNKS: FREEDOM AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (2012) (arguing that the Internet 
is now solely a tool of social control by the corporate state).  It should be noted that for over 
thirty years, Chomsky has been chronicling how tax and regulatory reform creates and 
increases economic inequality and social ill-welfare.  Some of Chomsky’s work in this area is 
discussed below.  See infra notes 7 and 10. 
 4. As discussed more fully in Part II, the literature’s argument that a consumption tax 
would be as fair as an income tax can be summarized as three parts.  The first part could be 
called the “redistributive” argument that a consumption tax could meet any redistributive 
demand one might have.  The second could be called the “equivalence” argument that a 
consumption tax is so much like an income tax that it could not possibly be more unfair than 
the income tax.  The third could be called the “benefit” argument that since the only value of 
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argues that the persistent and widespread wariness about replacing our 
current hybrid consumption tax/income tax system with a pure consumption 
tax is, contrary to what the pro-consumption tax literature asserts, completely 
justified.  In fact, our reservations about the consumption tax’s fairness 
reflect legitimate concern about the role of capitalist power in America, 
particularly over the past thirty years.  Indeed, the more the nation continues 
to experience the social welfare effects of increased capitalist power, the 
more compelling these objections become.  History proves these concerns 
not just legitimate, but paramount.  A full account, not a dismissal, of how 
capitalist power might benefit from a consumption tax is what would be 
required to meet these fairness objections.  Part II of this Article fleshes out 
the fairness objections more fully and addresses the counter arguments that 
exist in the literature.  In doing so, it seeks to reestablish the legitimacy of 
fairness objections to a consumption tax and encourage more robust and 
historically aware considerations of distributive justice in tax policy.  Part II 
goes further and shows that the consumption tax literature gets it wrong in a 
particularly revealing way.  Part II characterizes the pro-consumption tax 
literature’s dismissal of serious fairness and distributive justice concerns as, 
essentially, ideological; the literature’s very framing of the fairness issue 
precludes any serious consideration of the historical reality of capitalist 
power.  Ideology, not argument, supports the claim that capitalist power is 
not a concern.   
Tax scholars interested exclusively in the tax fairness argument should 
continue directly to Part II.  The remainder of Part I places the ideology 
critique of the consumption tax debate in the context of Occupy Wall Street 
                                                                                                               
holding even vast accumulations of wealth is what that person actually spends in the form of 
consumption (e.g., buying political favors, huge estates, and yachts) a consumption tax would 
tax (if structured as a sales tax or a tax on capitalist consumption) the entire value or benefit of 
owning the country that the capitalist experiences or could have.  This Article criticizes the 
benefit argument almost exclusively.  It argues that the pro-consumption tax literature 
radically underexamines the historical reality of how capitalist power actually operates to the 
benefit of the capitalist class.  It further argues that the benefits of owning the country far, far 
exceed what any individual capitalist could ever spend in mere dollars.  The way in which 
large accumulations of capital rig the system in favor of the owners of the country goes well 
beyond any narrow analysis of what any given capitalist might spend on buying a politician, a 
vote, or a mansion.  To the extent an income tax, rather than a consumption tax, imposes a tax 
on capital accumulations as such, it can be seen as a surtax on the source of capitalist power: 
the ownership of the country by a tiny minority itself.  Accordingly, this Article claims that 
there is, in fact, a very good reason behind the widely held intuition that a consumption tax is 
fundamentally unfair.  The only way the pro-consumption tax proponents can argue otherwise 
is by framing their whole approach in a highly abstracted way that precludes consideration of 
the reality of how capitalist power actually operates historically.  As explained in greater detail 
below (see discussion infra Part I.C–D), erasure of history and power is the hallmark of 
ideological social theory. 
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and introduces some recent work in critical theory.  The point is to encourage 
legal scholars to reflect on the distinct possibility that much of the work on 
economic regulation in American law schools is similarly ideological—
effectively promoting the interests of the capitalist class regardless of the 
actual social welfare effects.  Part I(B) suggests that history, in the form of 
Occupy Wall Street, has already confirmed this grim legacy.  Parts I(C) and 
(D) explore ways to overcome this legacy and introduce to the literature 
some recent work in critical theory that legal scholars of all stripes are 
encouraged to appreciate. 
 
B. Occupy Wall Street (“OWS”) and American Legal Scholarship on 
Economic Regulation 
 
OWS should cause us to reflect on the role of legal scholarship may have 
played in America’s rising inequality over the past thirty-odd years.  
Personally, my participation in OWS confirmed what I had suspected all 
along: that my own scholarship in tax and distributive justice was at best 
irrelevant and, at worst, part of an ideology of law designed to decrease 
rather than increase social welfare (or, if you like, “efficiency”).5  The casual 
discussions on law and distributive justice at OWS were far more rigorous in 
their social welfare analysis than anything I had experienced in law school or 
legal scholarship.  The reason was simple.  OWS was based in reality and 
pulled no punches in identifying capitalist rent seeking as the chief cause of 
America’s recent discontent.  OWS dared to discuss publicly the very 
reasonable idea that over the past few decades the 1%6 simply sucked up the 
nation’s wealth through a relentless campaign state regulatory capture (“de-
regulation” and “reform”) under the banner of bogus economic theory and 
                                                
 5. As a law professor, my areas of concentration were distributive justice and tax policy.  
However, my past scholarship is subject to the same criticism made of tax policy scholarship 
in this Article.  See, e.g., Patrick Crawford, Analyzing Fairness Principles in Tax Policy: A 
Pragmatic Approach, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 155 (1998); Patrick Crawford, The Utility of the 
Equity/Efficiency Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501 (1997); Patrick 
Crawford, The Genius of American Corporate Law, by Roberta Romano, 49 BUS. LAW. 1955 
(1994) (book review); Patrick Crawford, Report on Prop. Regs § 1.1001-3: Modifications of 
Debt Instruments, 47 TAX. LAW 987 (1994); Patrick Crawford, Inefficiency and Abuse of 
Process in Banking Regulation: Asset Seizures, Law Firms, and the RICOization of Banking 
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 205 (1993); Patrick Crawford, Indopco v. Commissioner: Form Over 
Substance in the Judicial Regulation of the Market for Corporate Control, 12 VA. TAX REV. 
121 (1992). 
 6. This Article uses the term “1%” to refer to the owners of the country—the capitalist 
class—who have taken almost all the gains from economic growth over the past decades.  See 
infra notes 7 and 8.  Similarly, this Article uses the term “99%” to refer to those controlled by 
the 1%—the labor class—who have seen their incomes, wealth, and overall welfare fall 
precipitously during this same period.  Id. 
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other self-serving ideologies—a subject legal academics, perhaps 
understandably, would not broach.7 
                                                
 7. The OWS claim (always implicit, often explicit) that inequality is the intended result 
of legal and regulatory “reforms” over the past thirty years is recognized in the economic 
literature.  Joseph Stiglitz’s recent book, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided 
Society Endangers Our Future, is largely a restatement of the OWS theme.  As Stiglitz writes:  
American inequality didn’t just happen.  It was created. . . . [O]ur growing 
inequality—especially the amounts seized by the upper 1 percent—is a 
distinctly American “achievement.” . . .  Much of the inequality that exists 
today is the result of government policy, both what the government does 
and what it does not do.  
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY 
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 35 (2012).  He continues:  
Our political system has increasingly been working in ways that increase 
the inequality of outcomes and reduce the equality of  opportunity.  This 
should not come as a surprise: we have a political system that gives 
inordinate power to those at the top, and they have used that power not 
only to limit the extent of redistribution, but also to shape the rules of the 
game in their favor and to extract from the public what can only be called 
large “gifts.”  
Id. at 32.  Economists have a name for this behavior.  It is called “rent seeking”—in other 
words, accumulating income without creating wealth for the rest of society.  Emmanuel Saez, 
the economist almost solely responsible for actually measuring the increasing inequality in the 
U.S., put the point more delicately:  
A number of factors may help explain this increase in inequality, not only 
underlying technological changes but also the retreat of institutions 
developed during the New Deal and World War II—such as progressive 
tax policies, powerful unions, corporate provision of health and retirement 
benefits, and changing social norms regarding pay inequality.  We need to 
decide as a society whether this increase in income inequality is efficient 
and acceptable and, if not, what mix of institutional and tax reforms 
should be developed to counter it.  
Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (2012), 
at 5, available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf.  As previously 
mentioned, Chomsky has also chronicled in detail how “deregulation” and “reform” over the 
past decades accomplishes the objective of “robbing public resources.”  See Noam Chomsky, 
Free Market Fantasies: Capitalism in the Real World, Talk at Harvard University (Apr. 13, 
1996) [hereinafter Free Market Fantasies] (transcript available at http://www.chomsky.info/ 
talks/19960413.htm); Humanity, supra note 3.  And as Chomsky explained back in 1997, it 
was explicit social policy through the tax and transfer system, and not the “market economy,” 
that spurred the rising inequality that necessitated OWS:  
The United States has by far the highest level of inequality of any 
industrial society. . .  After having declined from 1945 to the 1970s, it is 
now increasing.  [Inequality] is now back to around what it was in the 
1920s—and still going up.  That picture . . . is true but it’s good to 
disaggregate it—break it up into its components.  Participation in the 
economy—what’s called “the market economy” and that’s misleading—
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To put it bluntly, legal scholars of economic regulation should be as 
embarrassed as I was that it took such extreme inequality, social ill-welfare, 
and extraordinary acts of civil disobedience to bring this idea to the fore.  
Our staggering decline in social welfare was perfectly obvious to everyone, 
yet it took non-specialists to raise the most compelling and important social 
welfare analysis of the day.8  Neither the fact of inequality, nor the “market” 
                                                                                                               
participation in the economy leads to a certain distribution of income.  
Okay, so you have a job, spend money and so on, and that leads to a 
certain distribution of income.  Then comes the second factor, a social 
policy, which is taxes and transfers. . . .  If you compare the U.S. with 
other industrial societies in market outcomes, what’s the inequality there?  
Well, it’s about the same as other societies . . . in terms of distribution of 
income from market outcomes.  If you add the effect of social policy, the 
U.S. diverges radically.  So you take into account taxes and transfers and 
you find the inequality growing very sharply because that’s the nature of 
social policy in the U.S. and increasingly in England.  And that’s the 
Reagan-Thatcher Revolution.  Well, okay, those are decisions, they are not 
laws of nature. . . . This is real and it is the domestic variant of the 
international picture.  
Santarchy, Noam Chomsky: “Free Markets?”, YOUTUBE (Dec. 6, 1997), at 14:00–16:00 
[hereinafter Free Markets?], http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHj2GaPuEhY.  None of 
this would be news to Adam Smith, of course, who pretty much thought it was an a priori truth 
that any law or regulation touched by capital is a social welfare disaster.  As Smith put it:  
To widen the market, and to narrow the competition, is always the interest 
of the dealers. . . .  The proposal of any new law or regulation of 
commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to 
with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been 
long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with 
the most suspicious attention.  It comes from an order of men, whose 
interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have 
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who 
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.  
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 267 
(1976). 
 8. The distributional facts, in particular, were clear as day.  As is often the case, though, it 
took economists outside the orthodox economic styles now taught in law schools to do the 
empirical work on inequality.  The empirical work of economists Thomas Piketty and 
Emmanuel Saez in 2003 documented distributional trends using Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) data.  See generally Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United 
States, 1913-1998, 2003 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003).  The data in their article and its analysis have 
been updated several times.  The most current version is a “summary for the broader public.”  
See Saez, supra note 7.  The data establishes that concentration in the hands of the 1% (i.e., 
families with income above $7,890,000) is particularly extreme:  
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reforms that caused it, were really ever raised as a topic of law school 
discussion, let alone comprehensively examined from a perspective of 
distributive justice in the academic literature (including, to a surprising 
extent, the so-called “critical legal studies” literature).9  Lack of interest in 
                                                                                                               
  
Id. at 10 fig.3.  The updated data also indicates that families in the 1% income class captured a 
full 93% percent of the gains in the “recovery” of 2009 to 2010.  Id. at 6.  Emmanuel Saez has 
said, with understatement, that “Such an uneven recovery can help explain the recent public 
demonstrations against inequality.”  Id. at 4.  Citing this work, The MacArthur Foundation 
named Saez a “Genius” Fellow in 2010.  See Kathleen Maclay & Sarah Yang, Two Young 
Faculty Members Named MacArthur “Genius” Fellows, UC BERKELEY NEWS CTR. (Sept. 28, 
2010), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2010/09/28/macarthur/. 
 9. I am speaking mostly of the area with which I am most familiar: tax law.  There are 
here, as elsewhere, important exceptions of course that do discuss the role of regulatory 
“reform” in creating inequality.  One relatively recent article discusses the distributional 
effects of lobbying.  See C.M.A. McCauliff, Didn’t Your Mother Teach You to Share?: 
Wealth, Lobbying and Distributive Justice in the Wake of the Economic Crisis, 62 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 383 (2010).  There are law review articles in the area of taxation addressing the 
relationship of increasing inequity and regulation as well as crucial historical analyses.  But 
these do not reflect on the meaning of OWS for tax scholarship per se.  See, e.g., Jonathan 
Barrett, Wealth Transfer Tax Redux?, 17 N.Z. J. TAX’N L. & POL’Y, 289 (2011) (examining the 
intellectual history of the wealth tax); Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founder’s Stock, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 60, 76 (2011) (discussing an increase in income concentration and the taxation of 
founder’s stock); Edward J. McCaffery & James R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for 
Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2010) (discussing the political viability of a 
progressive consumption tax); James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New 
Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129 (2008) (discussing tax system design given 
distributional trends); David Frederick, Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of the 
Federal Estate Tax, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197 (2007) (discussing the history of the estate 
tax); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era 
Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV 1793 
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the causes of inequality alone cannot account for this gap in the scholarship.  
The realities of distributive injustice are simply too blatant and important.  
One must look instead at the ideology of legal scholarship to understand the 
dynamics of such avoidance.  This Article explains how ideology in legal 
scholarship operates to obscure, rather than illuminate, the most important 
distributive justice issue of our time.  
Sustained ideology critique and critical reflection can help to ensure that 
our language of the law—the way lawyers, judges, politicians, and the public 
think and speak about the law—does not block out the type of serious 
normative legal analysis that OWS expressed.  As things stand, the lack of a 
counter-narrative to, for instance, the “economic” analysis of the law, means 
that, quite often, the only voice in the courtroom, Senate hearing, or public 
debate is the voice of “free market fantasies”10—the voice of capital.  It 
                                                                                                               
(2005) (providing an intellectual history of fiscal policy and the evolution of the income tax); 
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV 993 (2004) 
(explaining how tax policy progressed to contribute to distributional inequity); William G. 
Gale, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration 2001-2004, 45 B.C. 
L. REV. 1157 (2004).  In the body of legal scholarship on economic regulation more generally, 
reflection on what OWS might mean for scholarship—let alone an ideology critique of such 
scholarship in light of OWS—is almost entirely absent.  Of all the scholarship  mentioning 
OWS—over 110 articles—relatively few (the author could find only one) critically examine 
ideology or “patterns of thought” in legal scholarship on economic regulation with OWS in 
mind.  See Matthew Titolo, Privatization and the Market Frame, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 493, 556 
(2012) (attacking the neo-liberal market analysis and urging instead “productive intellectual 
engagement with the . . . world”).  The critical legal studies scholarship, at least in its “critical 
tax theory” variant, is also largely silent on capitalist power, focusing instead on identity 
politics.  See, e.g., BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009).  All but perhaps two of the articles in 
this compendium deal with issues of race, gender, or sexual orientation.  None come anywhere 
near the type of realist analysis advocated in this Article—that is, an analysis that examines 
how capitalist power (be it gay/straight, white/black, or male/female) created the current, 
radically unequal, socio-economic environment.  For a more thorough critique of the critical 
tax theory movement on these grounds, see Patrick Crawford, What’s So Critical About 
Critical Tax Theory?, LAWCRIT (forthcoming 2014), http://lawcrit.com/. 
 10. Chomsky has long taken apart “free market fantasies.”  As he puts it:  
The very concept of capitalism and markets has virtually disappeared. . . . 
Those things [democracy and free markets] have given the U.S. a real 
“force multiplier” [in foreign relations].  It comes from “cold war 
investment in high technology” electronics, aviation, telecommunications, 
and so on.  That’s our “free market enthusiasms and democracy!”  Well, 
where did electronics, you know, aviation, and telecommunications come 
from?  Well, from public funds!  They don’t have anything to do with the 
free market.  They came from public funds, which were transferred to high 
technology industry under the conscious guise—[an actual] deceit—of 
security. . . . And probably nobody notices [this deceit], you know, 
because the concept of capitalism, just like the concept of democracy, is 
just gone—nobody knows what it is.  “Democracy” means “deceive 
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would be a rare thing indeed to hear anything like the following 
counterargument (admittedly made up here on the fly): 
 
Your Honor, this “market analysis” has nothing to do with 
legitimate economic theory.  It’s just a cover to argue for a 
wealth transfer from the public to this industry.  Please 
include in the record this critique by [e.g., Stiglitz, etc.] that 
the market analysis by [e.g., Verizon in, say, Verizon v. FCC 
(invalidating net neutrality)] is bogus and self-serving.  What 
Verizon calls the “free market” is really a state subsidy; what 
it calls “efficiency” is a wealth transfer.  So let’s abandon 
any talk of markets or efficiency and focus on the real issue 
here: the ability of the FCC to regulate public resources for 
the public good.  
 
The suggestion here is that legal academics are, in a very real way, 
responsible for distorting legal theory and the language of American law to 
foreclose any real social welfare analysis.  As a consequence, they mostly 
serve only one interest—the interest of capital.  As Joseph Stiglitz remarked: 
 
A massive program to “educate” people, and especially 
judges [and Treasury Secretaries, and Presidents], regarding 
these new doctrines [Chicago school economics] of law and 
economics, partly sponsored by right-wing foundations like 
the Olin Foundation, was successful.  The timing was ironic: 
American courts were buying into notions that markets were 
“naturally” competitive and placing a high burden of proof 
on anyone claiming otherwise just as the economics 
discipline was exploring theories that explain why markets 
often were not competitive . . . The influence of the Chicago 
school should not be underestimated.  Even when there are 
blatant infractions—like predatory pricing . . . they’ve been 
hard to prosecute.11 
                                                                                                               
people into doing what the rich people want” and “markets” mean “make 
sure the public subsidizes the rich.”  
Free Market Fantasies, supra note 7, at at 14:00–16:00. 
 11. STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 44–45.  Stiglitz has, of course, often ridiculed the Chicago 
school enthusiasts in his own profession.  In one post-OWS lecture, he was particularly critical 
of professional economists’ responses to the problem of the unemployed and working poor, 
saying:   
One out of six Americans can’t get jobs. . . . For the first time since the 
data has been collected in the U.S., more than forty percent of Americans 
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If anything, Stiglitz is being polite here.12  Legal scholarship and teaching has 
strongly supported the most serious welfare disaster—the most unjust theft of 
public wealth—in more than half a century.  Recall that normative legal 
theory is supposed to suggest how economic regulation might enhance social 
welfare.  The trajectory of legal scholarship over the past thirty-odd years has 
been in precisely the opposite direction, strengthening rather than decrying 
the very “market based” ideologies of “reform” that attempt to justify the 
very serious, debilitating, and brutal effects on the general population.13  It is 
quite likely that in fifty years this entire body of legal scholarship on 
economic regulation will appear as obvious rank ideology, providing a 
framework for thinking about our legal system that was designed to provide 
cover for one of the biggest wealth transfers in history, in the wrong 
direction.14  Unless legal scholars seriously reflect on their own work from 
                                                                                                               
who have been unemployed have been unemployed for more than six 
months.  We used to have a dynamic labor market. . . . A new category has 
been originated called “ninety-nine weekers”—people who have been 
unemployed for more than ninety-nine weeks for which there is essentially 
no social safety net in the U.S.  This is not the way a market economy is 
supposed to work. . . . It’s not supposed to lead to a massive misallocation 
of economic resources.  Market equilibrium in the labor market means 
where demand equals supply and that means no unemployment.  There are 
some schools of economic thought, believe it or not, that think what is 
going on now is not unemployment.  They just think some people decided 
to enjoy a little bit more leisure [laughter in the audience].  And when I 
ask them “Why are they so unhappy?” they say, “That’s not a problem for 
economics.  That’s a problem for psychiatry.”   
Joseph Stiglitz, 2011 Arnold C. Harberger Distinguished Lecture on Economic Development 
at the UCLA Burkle Center (Apr. 26, 2011), http://web.international.ucla.edu/burkle/article/ 
120926. 
 12. For a more stinging indictment on the liberal intellectual class’s ideological function, 
see CHRIS HEDGES, DEATH OF THE LIBERAL CLASS 13 (2010). 
 13. An examination of the intellectual history of legal scholarship on economic 
regulation—from banking law to tax law—over the past thirty years is, of course, beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Nevertheless, this claim seems accurate. 
 14. Capitalist rent seeking, of course, has always been one of America’s great traditions.  
As the late Gore Vidal noted, the United States has always been this way, varying only in 
degree.  Vidal wrote:  
There is only one party in the United States, the Property Party . . . and it 
has two right wings: Republican and Democrat.  Republicans are a bit 
stupider, more rigid, more doctrinaire in their laissez-faire capitalism than 
the Democrats, who are cuter, prettier, a bit more corrupt . . . and more 
willing than the Republicans to make small adjustments when the poor, 
the black, the anti-imperialists get out of hand.  But, essentially, there is no 
difference between the two parties.    
GORE VIDAL, MATTERS OF FACT AND FICTION: ESSAYS 1973-1976 268 (1977). 
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the historical context of OWS and rising inequality, it seems likely that their 
efforts will be viewed as little more than a Malthusian deceit.15 
 
C. How Best to Eliminate Pro-Capitalist Ideology in American Legal 
Scholarship 
 
How does one who cares about American legal scholarship (and 
American social welfare) respond to this descent into rank ideology?  
Certainly revisionism is unsatisfactory.16  One possibility would be to just 
start doing legal scholarship on a more “realist” basis, examining in specific 
detail how power has operated over the past thirty years to effect socially 
                                                
 15. In England in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Thomas Malthus argued for 
reform of the Poor Laws of England that had brought relief to the poor through a tax in the 
parishes.  See T.R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Geoffrey Gilbert 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1798); see also English Poor Laws, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Poor_Laws (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (providing a 
detailed explanation of the English Poor Laws).  More specifically, Malthus argued:  
 The poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the 
poor in these two ways.  Their first obvious tendency is to increase 
population without increasing the food for its support. . . .  
 Secondly, the quantity of provisions consumed in workhouses upon a 
part of the society that cannot in general be considered as the most 
valuable part diminishes the shares that would otherwise belong to more 
industrious and more worthy members, and thus in the same manner 
forces more to become dependent.  If the poor in the workhouses were to 
live better than they now do, this new distribution of the money of the 
society would tend more conspicuously to depress the condition of those 
out of the workhouses by occasioning a rise in the price of provisions. 
. . . .  
 I feel no doubt whatever that the parish laws of England have 
contributed to raise the price of provisions and to lower the real price of 
labour.  They have therefore contributed to impoverish that class of people 
whose only possession is their labour.  
MALTHUS, supra, at 39–40.  Historian Lynn Hollen Lees explains that Malthus’s arguments 
shaped social attitudes and policies in Britain for half a century, and “Mathusianism and the 
hostility to the poor laws it fostered set the intellectual tone for debate on the poor laws well 
into the 1840s.”  See LYNN HOLLEN LEES, THE SOLIDARITIES OF STRANGERS: THE ENGLISH 
POOR LAWS AND THE PEOPLE, 1700-1948, at 91 (1998).  However, Malthusian inspired reform 
of the poor laws did not lead to higher wages and higher employment.  In fact, Malthusian 
“reform,” when implemented, actually depressed wages and was merely a part of a package of 
measures to “achieve a submissive . . . proletariat at minimal cost.”  See K.D.M. SNELL, 
ANNALS OF THE LABOURING POOR: SOCIAL CHANGE AND AGRARIAN ENGLAND 1660-1900, at 
123, 130 (1985).  Malthus’s “starving the poor is for their own good” legal reasoning still 
resonates today in, for instance, the arguments against raising the minimum wage. 
 16. Indeed, the revisionism may have already begun.  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, A 
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).  
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deleterious wealth transfers through legal “reform.”17  Another approach—the 
one taken in this Article—is to take apart existing scholarship through a 
sustained ideology critique demonstrating how such scholarship is, 
fundamentally, pro-capitalist ideology.  It seems right that both strategies 
should operate simultaneously. 
Directly criticizing American legal scholarship on economic regulation 
as a whole might seem inappropriate given the uniformity of the orthodox 
discourse.  In response to any such criticism, I would just say that objections 
to tone, style, or appropriateness are almost always just ruses to reject the 
argument without seriously engaging it.  In any event, there is simply no nice 
way to put the thesis that legal scholars carry water for the ruling class.  
Indeed, it behooves the legal scholar to take that indictment seriously.  For if 
there is even a grain of truth to the claim that legal scholarship in America is 
                                                
 17. Guidance for such a realist approach to the law is provided by the philosopher 
Raymond Geuss, who has put forth a program of legal realism directly informed by the 
philosophical tradition of critical theory.  Geuss’s work cannot be examined in detail in this 
Article but, in broad contour, Geuss’s analysis suggests that social theorists—including legal 
theorists—must give an adequate and historically informed account of how power (including 
capitalist power in the contemporary context) operates to shape laws, ideology, and social and 
economic life.  In Part I(D), I introduce Geuss’s general approach by quoting Geuss’s own 
words as he attacks John Rawls’s political philosophy as pernicious ideology.  I take Geuss’s 
ideology critique as showing what, from the perspective of critical theory and Geuss’s realist 
project, is wrong with social theory in America (particularly liberal theory), and how Geuss’s 
realist approach avoids these errors.  That is, Geuss attacks Rawlsian theory for failing to 
account for the historical reality of power.  Geuss’s own approach, which I endorse in this 
Article, provides an adequate account of the historical reality of power.  Part II criticizes the 
pro-consumption tax literature as precisely the type of legal or social theory that Geuss rejects 
in his attack on Rawls.  What Geuss says about Rawls can also be said of the consumption tax 
literature: ahistorical analysis lacking an adequate account of power makes rigorous analysis 
of issues of justice impossible and performs an ideological function.  Interpreting Geuss’s 
work as establishing a form of legal realism is supported by the readings of Brian Leiter, 
though Leiter interprets Geuss much less sympathetically.  See Patrick Crawford, What It 
Means to Be a “Crit”: A (Re)-Introduction to Raymond Geuss’s Legal Realism, 43 SW U. L. 
REV. 1 (forthcoming 2014).  Among the works by Leiter that I criticize are: Brian Leiter, In 
Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 865, 885–93 
(2012); Brian Leiter, Geuss on "Real Politics", LEITER REP: A PHIL. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2008, 1:46 
PM), http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2008/10/geuss-on-real-p.html; Brian Leiter, 
Geuss's Skepticism About Rawls, LEITER REP: A PHIL. BLOG (Oct. 14, 2007, 6:50 PM), 
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2007/10/geusss-skeptici.html.  Admittedly, this Article 
does not actually do the type of realist tax policy analysis it tries to defend.  For empirically 
and historically based analyses of the tax system that feature robust accounts of power and 
expose the many ways that tax law supports rent seeking, exploitation, and other abuses, see 
DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, THE FINE PRINT: HOW BIG COMPANIES USE “PLAIN ENGLISH” TO ROB 
YOU BLIND (2012); DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: HOW THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS 
ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (2008); DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY 
LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND 
CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE (2005). 
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pro-capitalist ideology, then the credibility of all that work is destroyed, as its 
effects on the legal system and the social welfare become all too clear.  It is 
fair to say that much more than a grain of truth exists here.  Thus, there is an 
urgent need for an alternative language of the law that practicing lawyers, 
government officials, law professors, and analysts can speak in place of the 
free market fantasies that now prevail.  A viable alternative language must 
have within it the terms to demonstrate, on a moment’s notice as it were, why 
talk of “free markets,” “efficiency,” and “governmental intrusion” are 
(almost always) bogus covers for crass, welfare minimizing wealth 
transfers.18 
 
D. What Is Ideology Critique and Critical Theory? 
 
Turning away from the general context, the specific thesis of this Article 
is that the pro-consumption tax literature is perniciously ideological.19  If this 
                                                
 18. For a good source on such demonstrations, see CHANG, supra note 1; see also Free 
Market Fantasies, supra note 7 (discussing “free market fantasies” and “what they don’t teach 
you about capitalism”); Patrick Crawford, Selected Arguments Against Market Theory for 
Lawyers, LAWCRIT (forthcoming 2014), http://lawcrit.com/. 
 19. The term “pernicious ideology” is taken from Geuss’s work on Frankfurt School 
critical theory.  See RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL 12–13 (1981) [hereinafter CRITICAL THEORY] (describing the properties 
of “ideology in the pejorative sense” as distinguished from ideology in the descriptive sense).  
The term “ideology” can refer to any concept or theory or view of a group and therefore can 
be either a good thing or a bad thing.  Id.  The notion of “ideology critique” will be familiar to 
those who have read within the German critical tradition of Marx and  the variants of Marxian 
theory.  See id. at 5 (referencing the “vulgar Marxist distin[ction] between (economic) base 
and (ideological) superstructure”).  As previously stated, this Article uses Geuss’s critique of 
Rawls’s theory of justice as a model for the identification and critique of ideology in the 
pejorative sense in tax policy analysis.  The claim here is, more generally, that what Geuss 
says of Rawls—“[a] theoretical approach with no place for a theory of power [which] is not 
merely deeply deficient but actively pernicious, because mystifying”—can be said with equal 
or greater force of the pro-consumption tax literature and of the treatment of economic 
regulation in the law review literature overall.  See GEUSS, supra note 2, at 94.  As readers 
may be unfamiliar with Geuss’s work, some more introductory remarks may be in order.  
Geuss is arguably the leading English-speaking scholar of (among other important traditions in 
the history of philosophy) critical theory and the philosophical analysis of ideology (from 
Marx to Nietzsche to Foucault).  His earlier work analyzed the properties of types of ideology 
in the pejorative sense and the possibility of a “critical theory” with exhaustive philosophical 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., supra CRITICAL THEORY.  In his later work, Geuss actually engages in 
“realist political philosophy” that “lays bare the forms of ideological thinking” so that we have 
actual examples of “ideology critique” to look to and a method to apply elsewhere.  See 
Raymond Geuss, Realism and Utopianism in Political Philosophy (May 8, 2010), 
http://philosophybites.com/2010/05/raymond-geuss-on-realism-in-political-philosophy.html.  
Geuss’s work is directly relevant to normative legal theory and one could spend a fruitful 
career examining the connections and moving the field in a Geussian realist direction.  A good 
general introduction to Geuss’s thinking on such matters is his lecture on the phenomenon of 
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thesis is accurate, then, I believe, the same claim can likely be made against 
all of the scholarship on economic regulation as well.20  If true, this thesis 
goes a very long way indeed in accounting for the oft-remarked fact that 
issues of distributive justice are significantly under analyzed in the tax policy 
scholarship and scholarship on economic regulation overall. 
The specific argument against the pro-consumption tax literature is quite 
simple.  The claim here is that the pro-consumption tax literature is clearly 
wrong to claim to have answered all distributive justice objections to shifting 
the tax burden from capital to labor.  In fact, the very mode of analysis of this 
literature is designed to erase any serious consideration of distributive justice 
in the first place.  When your worldview itself precludes any consideration of 
distributive justice, the conclusion that there is no distributive justice issue is 
hardly surprising.  The ideology critique in this Article identifies the aspects 
of the pro-consumption tax discourse that make serious consideration of 
distributive justice impossible.  In general, it is a lack of “realism” in favor of 
abstraction that hampers this discourse.  More specifically, this lack of 
realism consists of: (1) a lack of historical analysis, perspective, or 
consciousness, and (2) a lack of an adequate account of power.  
This Article suggests that these two elements are markers for pro-
capitalist ideology in American legal scholarship more generally.  I believe 
that recent work on ideology critique and critical theory backs up this claim.  
Specifically, Raymond Geuss’s explication of critical theory supports this 
claim.21  Geuss’s work on critical theory is rather extensive and detailed,22 
but what Geuss says about American academic political theory and theories 
of justice can be said equally about the pro-consumption tax literature’s 
treatment of distributive justice as well.  I ask the reader to consider carefully 
Geuss’s criticism of Rawlsian theory and ask, “doesn’t this criticism apply 
exactly to the types of analyses that now dominate American academic legal 
culture?”23  I believe what Geuss says about the dominant strain in American 
                                                                                                               
wishful thinking.  See Raymond Geuss, Talk at the University of Minnesota Institute for 
Advanced Study: Realism, Wishful Thinking, and Utopia (May 6, 2010) (transcript available 
at https://events.umn.edu/001415).  As mentioned, Geuss’s critical, realist legal theory has 
been recognized as such, though it has been grossly mischaracterized and, therefore, has not 
heretofore been applied, to the author’s knowledge, in any accurate manner in American legal 
scholarship.  See Crawford, supra note 17.  
 20. This claim follows from the reasonable assertion that the pro-consumption tax 
scholarship represents the best and most sophisticated of the economic analysis of law in the 
literature.  As goes it, so goes the rest. 
 21. I say “believe” because I do not know if Geuss would agree that his analysis and his 
“realism” can be so simply applied and extended to American legal scholarship the way I am 
doing. 
 22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 23. I should say it also applies to so-called “crit” work as well, in so far as it is not focused 
on a historically based analysis of power and class struggle. 
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political philosophy applies with equal force to the consumption tax debate 
and, by extension, all discussions of fairness in the orthodox literature on 
economic regulation.  Geuss writes: 
 
Is it, though, or should it be, of any significance that the 
“normative” moral and political theory of the Rawlsian type 
has nothing, literally nothing, to say about the real increase 
in inequality, except perhaps “so much the worse for the 
facts”?  This is not a criticism to the effect that theoreticians 
should act rather than merely thinking, but a criticism to the 
effect that they are not thinking about relevant issues in a 
serious way. 
. . . . 
For a small number of English-speaking philosophers, 
then, the only way to make discernible progress in political 
philosophy is by studying history, social and economic 
institutions, and the real world of politics in a reflective way.  
This is not incompatible with “doing philosophy;” rather, in 
this area, it is the only sensible way to proceed.  After all, a 
major danger in using highly abstractive methods in political 
philosophy is that one will succeed merely in generalizing 
one’s own local prejudices and repackaging them as 
demands of reason.  The study of history can help to 
counteract this natural human bias. 
 . . . .  
For those of us with views like these, Rawls is not a 
major moral and political theorist, whose work self-evidently 
deserves and repays the most careful scrutiny.  Rather, he 
was a parochial figure who not only failed to advance the 
subject but also pointed political philosophy firmly in the 
wrong direction.24 
 
Geuss also writes: 
 
In real politics, theories like that of Rawls are nonstarters, 
except, of course, as potential ideological interventions.  A 
theoretical approach with no place for a theory of power is 
not merely deeply deficient but actively pernicious, because  
 
 
                                                
 24. RAYMOND GEUSS, OUTSIDE ETHICS 38–39 (2009). 
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mystifying.  This is not a criticism of some individual aspect  
of Rawls’s theory, but a basic repudiation of his whole way 
of approaching the subject of political philosophy.25 
 
Simply replace “Rawls” with “economic analysis of law” or “analyses of 
fairness on legal scholarship generally” and you get the same indictment.  
They all lack an adequate account of history and power and, in so doing, can 
be viewed as ideological interventions.   
Part II of this Article shows exactly how the pro-consumption tax 
literature ignores history and denies, rather than refutes, distributive justice 
objections to shifting the tax base away from the 1% and even more fully on 
to the 99%.26  Such scholarship plays much the same role in our intellectual 
culture as Rawlsian political philosophy; it allows liberal academics to feel 
like they are talking about justice while they avoid actually identifying the 
source of the injustice and, in so doing, upsetting the trustees.  Unlike the 
pro-consumption tax literature, rigorous distributive justice analysis 
addresses the reality of capitalist power and how, if left unchecked, it drives 
the country into serfdom.  And this focus on capitalist power brings us back 
to OWS’s message to legal scholarship on economic regulation: a non-
ideological analysis of economic regulation should address the distributive 
justice issues of inequality directly, placing them in the real historical context 
of class struggle, capitalist rent seeking, and regulatory capture by the 1%.27 
 
II.  AN IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX LITERATURE 
 
This Part refutes the pro-consumption tax literature’s claim that any and 
all fairness objections to shifting from an income to a consumption tax are 
rubbish.  It shows that, of course the consumption tax raises very serious 
fairness objections; of course lightening the load on capitalists while 
increasing the burden to labor raises fairness objections; and of course, as 
Smith might say, a tax reform that is backed by lobby groups like the 
American Enterprise Institute is presumptively unjust, “com[ing] from an 
order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, 
who have generally an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and 
who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed 
                                                
 25. GEUSS, supra note 2 at 94. 
 26. This characterization is unfair since the pro-consumption tax literature claims a 
consumption tax would not increase labor’s burden.  Part II doubts this claim, however, and 
argues that the literature’s fairness analysis is incomplete.   
 27. See Declaration of the Occupation of New York City, OCCUPY WALL STREET N.Y.C. 
GEN. ASSEMB. (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nycga.net/resources/documents/declaration. 
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it.”28  The point here is not that the consumption tax would necessarily be 
unjust, for it may very well be the best and most just system of taxation when 
properly implemented.  The pro-consumption tax literature may be perfectly 
correct in its ultimate conclusion that the consumption tax is fairer and more 
efficient than the current system.  In fact, many of the best progressive tax 
analysts outside of the legal academy have concluded just that.29  The point 
here, rather, is that the way the pro-consumption tax scholarship gets there—
the way it reaches its conclusion that no fairness objections exist—is 
problematic. 
Put another way, this Part criticizes the style and not (so much) the 
substance of the pro-consumption tax literature’s approach to fairness.  It 
argues that the pro-consumption tax literature frames its analysis in a manner 
that makes appreciation of the fairness objections to the consumption tax 
impossible.  The pro-consumption tax literature uses a highly abstracted form 
of econometric analysis that, like Rawlsian political theory, is radically 
ahistorical and, lacking an account of how capitalist power actually operates, 
cannot be expected to address concerns about the possibility of increased 
capitalist power under a consumption tax.  This erasure of the historical 
realities of capitalist power is the source of its erroneous claim that our 
intuitions against the consumption tax are wrong.  In this way, the pro-
consumption tax literature marginalizes fairness claims and, in so doing, has 
an ideological character.   
Part II’s ideology critique of the pro-consumption tax literature has 
implications for the law review literature on economic regulation overall, I 
believe.  Part II, in effect, asks legal scholars to reflect on how their own 
language, their own framing of fairness issues, might, like Rawlsian theory or 
the pro-consumption tax literature’s econometric analysis, prevent rather than 
confront the role that capitalist power plays in shaping welfare-minimizing 
laws and regulations.  Might other scholarship on economic regulation that 
ignores the historical reality of capitalist power also serve an ideological 
function?  Might this ideological function explain why this scholarship 
virtually ignored income inequality and the problem of capitalist rent seeking 
during the very same historical period where they had reached crisis levels?30  
Might a story about the ideological role of American legal scholarship provide 
an opportunity to bridge the gap between the American academic class and the 
general public, the 99% and OWS?  Might critical reflection on these matters 
                                                
 28. SMITH, supra note 7, at 267. 
 29. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Progressive Consumption Tax: A Win-Win Solution for 
Reducing American Economic Inequality, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2011, 7:12 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/12/the_progressive_consumption_tax_
a_win_win_solution_for_reducing_american_economic_inequality_.html. 
 30. See supra notes 7, 8, and 10 and accompanying text. 
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help to ensure that American legal scholarship on economic regulation avoids 
the legacy of Malthusian theories of law?31 
Admittedly, these questions are rather suggestive.  Part II does not prove 
that the trajectory of American legal scholarship on economic regulation has 
been ideological.  Rather, it sticks to what it knows and examines the 
ideological aspects of the pro-consumption tax discourse.  And even here, the 
claim is limited.  Part II does not claim to do justice to the pro-consumption 
tax literature overall, which is quite excellent, very sophisticated, and, by and 
large, unassailable.  For instance, and as previously noted, Part II’s ideology 
critique is perfectly consistent with the claim that a consumption tax could in 
fact be fairer and more efficient than our current income tax (through, for 
instance, a progressive consumption tax of a high rate of one hundred percent 
or more).32  That being said, the pro-consumption tax literature, and indeed 
the consumption tax debate overall, can tell us much about what ideology in 
American legal scholarship looks like and how we can use legal realism and 
critical theory of the Guessian variety to expand and enhance the literature. 
 Part II(A) summarizes the redistributive fairness argument made in 
Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach’s groundbreaking work, The 
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 
accepting it in principle but offering some criticism from a critical realist 
perspective.33  Part II(B) turns to the two other major fairness arguments in 
the literature, which are defended in Daniel Shaviro’s definitive Replacing 
the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax.34  Part II(B) is 
skeptical of both these arguments, but is particularly critical of the second 
one.  Part II(B)(1) addresses what can be called the equivalence argument 
that a consumption tax is so much like an income tax that the shift would not 
raise fairness issues.  Part II(B)(2) discusses what can be called the benefits 
argument that exempting capital accumulation from taxation is fair because 
the capitalist only benefits from capital expenditures and does not benefit at 
all from capital ownership and accumulation per se.  This Article’s ideology 
critique focuses almost exclusively on the benefits argument. 
Since Part II(B)(2) contains the core arguments of this Article, it is useful 
to summarize them here.  Mainly, it criticizes the claim that the benefits of 
                                                
 31. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 32. Indeed, Robert Frank has argued that a consumption tax of one hundred percent (or 
greater, theoretically) might be the best way to address inequality and would adequately meet 
the distributive justice demands of progressives.  See Frank, supra note 29.  I thank Duncan 
Foley for this point. 
 33. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax 
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006). 
 34. Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax 8–
9 (N.Y.U. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Series, Paper No. 70, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=444221. 
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ownership can be measured by expenditure alone.  The benefits argument 
would have us believe that the benefit of capitalist ownership can be reduced 
to the actual dollar amount the capitalist ends up spending in a given year.  
Bankman, Shaviro, and Weisbach dismiss the idea that capital accumulation 
and property ownership as such confer value to the capitalist and reduce the 
capitalist class power to the dollar amount the capitalist actually spends in 
any given time horizon.  Ownership as such, they say, is “Monopoly money,” 
conferring neither power nor control to the capitalist class (the 1%).35  Part 
II(B)(2) counters that the Monopoly money argument understates the benefits 
conferred on capitalists by virtue of their capital ownership.  Instead, it 
argues that the full extent of benefits capitalists enjoy can only be understood 
by reference to actual systems of capitalist power in our history.  That is, our 
system is specifically designed, from the outset, to benefit the 1%.  
Furthermore, this system of power is dynamic, with some periods, such as 
the present, particularly exemplary of the negative effects of increased 
capitalist influence and control.  The benefits argument ignores these realities 
and thus fails to understand, let alone address, intuitions that a consumption 
tax would only further increase capitalist power.  Part II(B)(2) contrasts its 
critique of the Monopoly money argument with the critiques previously 
offered by liberal ethical philosophers Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel.  It 
shows that, much like Rawlsian approaches to justice, Murphy and Nagel’s 
ahistorical approach fails to acknowledge the realities of capitalist power, 
and also fails to seriously counter the ideological Monopoly money 
argument.36  Thus, Part II(B)(2) criticizes both the neo-Rawlsian liberal and 
the Chicago-school econometric sides of the consumption tax debate, 
illustrating just how outside the norm a Geussian critical theory of the law 
would be.  Finally, Part II(C) concludes by commenting on the intellectual 
history of the consumption tax debate, identifying in the work of David 
Bradford a long tradition of marginalizing distributive justice under the 
banner of rigorous analysis. 
 
A. The Redistributive Fairness Argument 
 
Bankman and Weisbach show that an income tax creates inefficiency and 
claim that a consumption tax avoids such inefficiency and could be 
structured to meet any redistributive demand a society might have.37  Relying 
on commodity pricing modeling done by Stiglitz in the 1970s,38 Bankman 
                                                
 35. See discussion infra pp. 163–73. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1413. 
 38. A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect 
Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976). 
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and Weisbach show that a tax on capital returns as accrued (i.e., an income 
tax) causes economic actors to purchase commodities earlier than they 
otherwise would have, and that this creates a loss of social value—an 
“inefficiency” or “deadweight loss.”39  A consumption tax structured as a 
pure wage tax could avoid this inefficiency.  Bankman and Weisbach 
contend that a consumption tax could be designed to meet any revenue 
requirement and any redistributive demand.40  Therefore, they argue, a 
                                                
 39. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1419.  “To illustrate this numerically,” 
Bankman and Weisbach use the following example:   
Consider an individual, Z, who earns $100 in period one and is 
considering whether to spend the sum in period one or two.  Assume 
arbitrarily that the pretax rate of interest is 5%.  Absent taxes on interest 
income, Z could either consume $100 of goods in period one or save the 
$100, earn 5%, and consume $105 of goods in period two.  The $105 of 
goods in period two has a present value to the individual of $100.  Assume 
now that the return to savings is taxed at a 40% rate and is thus reduced to 
3%.  Z now must choose between consuming $100 in period one or $103 
in period two. 
 
Id.  By contrast, a tax of 2% on consumption of either $100 now or $105 later would 
impose a uniform tax on these commodities (e.g., a commodity purchased now 
versus a commodity purchased later).  
The effective tax rate levied on future-consumed goods increases as the 
time of consumption grows longer.  If, in the above example, consumption 
is deferred for three years, the tax reduces available consumption from 
$116 to $109—the equivalent of a sales tax of 6.4%.  After thirty years, 
the amount available is reduced from about $430 to $240.  This is 
equivalent to a sales tax of approximately 80%.  The choice between an 
income tax and a consumption tax can be restated as. . . whether such a 
sales tax is desirable.  As such, this question is part of the general issue of 
whether and when nonneutral commodity taxes are desirable.  
Id. 
 40. See id. at 1430.  Some, however, have doubted this claim.  See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY  & 
THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 96–109 (2002).  It does 
appear that Bankman and Weisbach fail to take account of the necessity for even a 
consumption tax to start digging into capital appreciation via a consumption tax of more than 
one hundred percent.  Take, for example, a 100 person society where 1 person (“Mr. 
Capitalist”) owns 100% of the property, earns $1000 a year from this property, does not work, 
and spends $100 on consumption per year.  Of the rest, 51% (“the Lumpen Proletariat”) enjoy 
the benefits of a “free” labor market and earn a survival wage of $5 each ($255 total).  The 
remaining 48% (“the 48%”) do not work and need $5 each ($240 total) just to survive.  In this 
stark reality, not that much different from our own, if we were not to force the Lumpen 
Proletariat into starvation, one would have to tax Mr. Capitalist on 240% of his consumption 
in order to keep the population from starving.  Apparently, in this society, a tax on capital 
would be required to meet the demands of redistribution.  As discussed earlier, Robert Frank 
has argued that a consumption tax of one hundred percent (or greater, theoretically) might be 
the best way to address inequality and would adequately meet the distributive justice demands 
of progressives.  See supra note 32. 
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consumption tax is more efficient and at least as redistributively fair as any 
income tax.41  They write: 
 
[T]he argument [for the redistributive fairness and efficiency 
of a consumption tax] does not depend on the relative degree 
of inequality in our society or our preferences for 
redistribution.  Therefore, the recent increases in inequality 
have no bearing on the choice between an income tax and a 
consumption tax.  Similarly, one’s views on the appropriate 
extent of redistribution have no effect on the argument.42 
 
It is important to note that Bankman and Weisbach are not showing with this 
argument alone that a consumption tax can meet all fairness demands—only 
redistributive ones.  They also limit their conclusions in other crucial ways, 
putting to the side, for instance, the problems of administration and 
compliance.43 
When compared with their otherwise carefully reasoned analysis, 
Bankman and Weisbach’s conclusion regarding fairness appears cavalier.  
For instance, Bankman and Weisbach enthusiastically endorse Shaviro’s 
argument (discussed more fully in Part II(B)(2)) that fairness objections to 
letting the 1% sit on their fortunes tax free (and only taxing them to the 
extent they actually spend some of the corpus) are “confused non 
sequitur[s].”44  Thus, they go out on quite a limb and tell us that our fairness 
reservations about letting capital be accrued tax free are not just wrong but, 
in fact, loopy.  Part II(B)(2) suggests that when Smith was bemoaning the 
influence of the masters of mankind,45 he was concerned about more than the 
annual expenditures that the capitalist class may make in any given year.  He 
was concerned about the historical reality of capitalist power, a reality that 
cannot be reduced to an entry in an accounting ledger. 
Before turning to Bankman and Weisbach’s argument, it may be useful 
to examine their rhetorical and general approach.  These features, I believe, 
are widely shared in the scholarship on economic regulation and can be 
viewed as markers for the type of abstract, ahistorical argumentation that is 
the hallmark of ideology from the realist perspective of critical theory.  
Paying attention in this way to the rhetoric and framing of the analysis in 
legal scholarship can help one to see the value and importance of 
                                                
 41. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1430. 
 42. Id.   
 43. Id. at 1415.  
 44. See Shaviro, supra note 34, at 48.   
 45. SMITH, supra note 7, at 448 (“All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in 
every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind.”). 
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incorporating historical awareness and a full account of class power into the 
analysis and scholarship on economic regulation.   
Indeed, it is hard not to notice the very abstract, even metaphysical, 
quality of Bankman and Weisbach’s fairness analysis.  That is to say, they 
view the world as an economic model and ignore the historical reality of 
capitalist power and class struggle.  This sort of abstraction, particularly 
when it occurs in the face of rising inequality and capitalist regulatory 
capture, raises some suspicion from a realist critical theory perspective.  
From a post-OWS perspective as well, their approach seems a little like 
smoke and mirrors since their analysis ignores what was literally occurring 
right outside their window: rising inequality and increasing regulatory 
capture.  These suspicions are not helped by the fact that pro-consumption 
tax advocates seem practically giddy at the possibility of structuring a 
consumption tax as a pure labor tax!46  Finally, Bankman and Weisbach’s 
approach follows the tradition in tax policy analysis of comparing ideal tax 
bases as a way to real world tax reform.  Under the historically grounded 
approach defended in this Article, comparing how ideal tax bases would play 
out according to abstract mathematical models is not the optimal strategy for 
identifying unfairness in our tax system or effective reform proposals.47 
Additionally, Bankman and Wiesbach’s employment of Stiglitz in the 
fight for a consumption tax is itself problematic.  For instance, one might ask 
whether Stiglitz would himself endorse Bankman and Weisbach’s pro-
                                                
 46. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1420.  That a consumption tax could be 
structured as a wage tax numerically equivalent to an income tax is easily shown.  While the 
pure form of a consumption tax would be a sales tax, a consumption tax is economically 
equivalent and could also be implemented as a tax on wage earnings under some (at least 
simple) assumptions.  A consumption tax is the same as an income tax on labor.  For instance, 
if I earn $100 and am taxed at 30%, this decreases my purchasing power by exactly the same 
amount as if I had not been taxed on my earnings but was taxed when I spent the full $100 and 
had to pay 30% sales tax.  Showing this equivalence to hold in the real world, however, is 
another matter.  For instance, one might doubt the viability of such a simple version of 
neoclassical general equilibrium theory, which the pro-consumption tax literature relies on.  
See, e.g., INETeconomics, Duncan Foley – Mathematical Formalism and Political-Economic 
Content, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqF3HQmGtWY 
(copy on file with author) (identifying the “Samuelsonian vice” of letting the abstract model 
trump the data in a “garbage in - garbage out” methodology and describing the economy as a 
whole as “a complex, adaptive system far from equilibrium”—if viewed as a mathematical 
model).  It is under this assumption that there appears to be an equivalence between taxing 
consumption and income.  Suffice it to say that a realist analysis might view wages in a very 
different light.  In the Marxist tradition, for instance, wages are determined by convention or 
subsistence and not according to a rarified thermodynamic model of equilibrium.  See, e.g., 
PRABHAT PATNAIK, THE VALUE OF MONEY (2009). 
 47. Chomsky’s tax policy analysis, by contrast, focuses on the realities of our existing tax 
and transfer system that operates, to a great extent, to transfer social resources and control to 
private capital and private power.  See Free Markets?, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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consumption tax project?48  After all, Stiglitz himself describes decreases in 
the capital gains rate as “the most egregious aspect of recent tax policy.”49  
Stiglitz recently even seemed to propose a surtax on capitalist rent seeking: 
“[I]f you could target taxes on that kind of rent seeking, you actually 
generate income and improve economic efficiency.  So, to the extent that you 
can target those kinds of rents, you oughta tax that as close to 100% as you 
can.”50  More generally, Stiglitz is very critical of such “law and economics” 
approaches as not only bad economics but also, essentially, propaganda for 
the rich.51  Stiglitz himself might be quite reserved about basing real world 
tax reform on highly abstract models which are not designed to reflect the 
full complexity of our historical reality, even if such models are his own.    
 These critical comments are only suggestive, however, and it may very 
well be that the Stiglitz model does show that a consumption tax is superior 
and can, in fact, meet any redistributive demands.  Thus, this Article does not 
take issue with the redistributive argument as such.  Part II(B) discusses the 
two other fairness arguments in turn, strongly criticizing the second argument 
as ideological. 
 
B. The Equivalence and Benefits Fairness Arguments  
 
1. The Equivalence Argument: The Consumption Tax “Gets At” 
Capital Accumulations 
 
As Shaviro puts it: 
 
[I]ncome and consumption taxation are less different than 
had been previously thought, because they differ only in 
their treatment of the riskless rate of return, which the 
income tax reaches but the consumption tax excludes, and 
                                                
 48. There are many contrasts between Stiglitz’s sensibilities and those of Bankman and 
Weisbach.  One would be very surprised, for instance, to hear Stiglitz reduce the world of 
culture to a commodity the way Bankman and Weisbach do.  Viewing culture as a commodity, 
they even entertain a surtax (for “technical reasons”) on “[l]ong, abstract novels and plays, 
modern art, and classical music.”  Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1453 (“[B]y taxing 
indicator goods, we can tax those of high ability in ways that a wage tax cannot.”).  It is hard 
to imagine Stiglitz proposing a surtax on the arts.  In fact, one would expect Stiglitz to argue 
for increasing their subsidy by the state. 
 49. STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 71. 
 50. Institute for New Economic Thinking, A Conversation on the Economy: Stiglitz and 
Krugman on the Financial Crisis and the Future of Economics, THE INST. BLOG (Oct. 26, 
2012), at 1:09, http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet/conversation-economy-stiglitz- 
and-krugman-financial-crisis-and-future-economics. 
 51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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which has historically averaged only about 1% a year above 
the inflation rate.52  [A consumption tax would tax] . . . Bill 
Gates in similar degree as the income tax, although his 
burden under the consumption tax might be less obvious.53 
 
Because a consumption tax “gets at” all but one percent of the amount of the 
capital so consumed, it largely replicates the income tax, while remaining 
different enough to appreciably increase efficiency.  Thus, the equivalence 
argument asserts a consumption tax would leave Gates and the laborer in the 
same relative positions tax-wise that they would be under an income tax.  
 
                                                
 52. The riskless return argument is that Microsoft founder, Bill Gates, is only specially 
taxed on 1% under an income tax because he can get a loss deduction on an investment and 
because he can “gross up” his investment to account for any taxes.  As Bankman and 
Weisbach explain:  
Suppose that a taxpayer makes a bet with a 50% chance of winning $100 
and a 50% chance of losing $100.  If, under an income tax, winnings and 
losses are both taxed at a 30% rate (losses being deducted at that rate), the 
bet is reduced from a $100 bet to a $70 bet.  If the taxpayer wins $100, he 
keeps $70 after paying taxes.  If he loses $100, he gets the benefit of the 
$100 deduction, reducing his after-tax losses to $70.  The taxpayer, 
however, can increase the size of the bet so that the bet will be worth $100 
after taxes.  In particular, if the taxpayer increases the size of his bet by      
1 / (1 − t), where t is the tax rate, he restores his pretax position.  With our 
numbers, the taxpayer makes a $143 bet, which produces winnings and 
losses of $100 after taxes.  
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1431.  Again, it would be useful to have this shown 
in reality. 
 53. Daniel Shaviro, Op. Ed., David Bradford, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2005), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB110964406044966694.  To show a consumption tax and 
an income tax are equal, consider the following example.  If I save $100 at 5% at a 40% 
income tax rate I have $103 to consume.  This is the equivalent of a sales tax of 2% in that 
year.  This near equivalence holds in other contexts as well.  In Gates’s case, for instance, one 
might view his wealth as arising from a transfer of social resources to him (e.g., IT developed 
by the military industrial complex) and the extraction of monopoly rents from society.  In this 
case, the initial $100 capital in the example would have no basis and the entire $105 would be 
taxed under an income tax when consumed (i.e., when the asset is sold) for a total post tax 
consumption value of $42.  This would be equivalent to a consumption tax of roughly 40%.  
This equivalence argument can be criticized in various ways.  See e.g., supra note 46 
(discussing criticism of equilibrium theory).  From the perspective of this Article, the main 
objection is that the equivalence argument is too abstract and ignores how power, not markets, 
creates “entrepreneurial” wealth.  Thus, one could argue that Gates received his wealth from 
state subsidy of high technology development and pure luck.  Also, it is doubtful that 
capitalists “gross up” their investments in a systematic or rational way as the example 
supposes.  Finally, what about the possibility that Gates’s extraordinary returns actually come 
from monopoly rents and other regulatory capture?  Are these historically supportable 
suggestions properly accounted for in Bankman and Weisbach’s analysis? 
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The equivalence argument is based on finance economics and perhaps 
can only be evaluated in these terms.  Nevertheless, when one considers how 
it might play out in the real world, one cannot help but be skeptical.  For 
instance, just how is it exactly that a consumption tax will “get at” a 
billionaire’s fortune in the same way that, say, a wage tax “gets at” all the 
money in the impoverished world of a chicken processing plant worker in 
Arkansas?  After all, to mention only one difference, even the most 
extravagant billionaire spends only a tiny fraction of his fortune over one 
exalted lifetime.54  Is a consumption tax really equal to the income tax in 
these regards?  Bankman does indeed worry that “the wealthy will almost 
certainly benefit disproportionately from the shift to a consumption tax.”55  In 
his work with Weisbach, however, he seems more comfortable with the 
“trust-fund baby problem.”56  This is the same problem as the Gates problem: 
how to “get at” Gates’s capital accumulation under a consumption tax and 
thereby mollify fairness objections?  Bankman and Weisbach describe the 
trust-fund baby problem as follows: 
 
[E]limination of the tax on savings and replacing it with a 
more progressive wage tax would seem to be manna from 
heaven [for the trust-fund baby].  Both [the wealthy retiree 
and the trust-fund baby] benefit from the elimination of tax 
on investment income, and neither have significant amounts 
of wage income.  Similarly, Bill Gates pays himself a very 
small salary.57   
 
Bankman and Weisbach dismiss the trust-fund baby problem as “misleading” 
and claim, cryptically, that the “intuition behind the example is wrong.”58  
But their argument for why the “intuition is wrong” (whatever that might 
mean exactly) is rather unclear.  It seems that Bankman and Weisbach are 
                                                
 54. Bankman and Weisbach sometimes write as if this were not actually a problem.  See, 
e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1437 (“[T]o the extent that Gates’s stock value 
reflects his labor income, it is taxed under a properly structured [sales-tax based] consumption 
tax.  The . . . problem can readily be solved.”).  The author confesses not to understand this 
claim.  Since the extent of Gates’s labor contribution is very small, how can consumption and 
labor equivalence get us anywhere?  Even if it were significant, how can anything but a 
fraction of Gates’s stock value be taxed at all under a sales-based consumption tax during his 
mortal life?  And if Bankman and Weisbach are talking about infinite time horizons, then is 
this equivalence really relevant for actual tax reform proposals?   
 55. Bankman & Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to the Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L. 
REV. 539, 568 (1998). 
 56. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1436, 1437. 
 57. Id. at 1436.   
 58. Id. 
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saying that the trust-fund baby and the Gates problem are solved by 
assuming a wage-based consumption tax that has been in place over an 
infinite time horizon.59  But assuming an infinite time horizon does not help 
one bit in addressing the fairness objections to shifting to a consumption tax 
in America in 2014.  But even if you could go back an infinite time horizon, 
you still could never get at all capital accumulation through the consumption 
tax.  This is immediately obvious from the historical realist point of view: go 
back a mere three hundred years and even if we had had a pure wage-based 
consumption tax, we would not get at the trust-fund baby’s corpus of today 
for the simple reason that the trust-fund baby’s corpus was never actually 
earned but was actually stolen from (for instance) the Native Americans.  
Most of the land and resources of this country were acquired by murder and 
theft, with zero earnings, and zero tax.  The same goes for any other country 
in history, in fact.  In a similar idealization, Bankman and Weisbach claim 
that “[m]ost of [Gates’s] net worth comes from his labor.”60  One does want 
to encourage the introduction of a labor theory of value among law and 
economics scholars, for it would at least introduce a measure of reality and 
re-connect them with the tradition of political economy from Ricardo to 
Marx.  But Weisbach (at least) insists on ignoring historical reality and 
painting a Horatio Aldger scenario for America.  If history is any judge, 
Gates’s fortune, like the fortune of almost any capitalist in history, probably 
arose more from the exercise of power than anything else.  In Gates’s case, 
for instance, one could reasonably argue that Microsoft was, and is, a highly 
subsidized venture.  After all, is it not the case that Microsoft essentially 
privatizes high technology developed through the state sector, exploits 
monopoly rents and generous intellectual property laws, and benefits 
enormously from a distinctly pro-business and anti-labor socio-economic 
environment?  These historical realities of capitalism are entirely absent from 
Bankman and Weisbach’s analysis.  But without addressing them, it seems 
impossible to support the claim that the consumption and income tax are 
actually equivalent.  This is because the equivalence argument is based, at 
least to some extent, on claims like “[m]ost of [Gates’s] net worth comes 
from his labor,”61 and these claims are not well supported by historical 
reality.  
 
                                                
 59. See id. at 1438. 
 60. Id. at 1437.  It would be quite ironic for Bankman and Weisbach to be asserting a labor 
theory of value here, although, from the perspective of critical theory or political economy, 
this would be a welcomed development.  For an introduction to the labor theory of value in the 
context of Marxist economic theory, see DUNCAN FOLEY, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL: MARX’S 
ECONOMIC THEORY 15–16 (1986). 
 61. See Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1437. 
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2. The Benefits Argument: Reifying Capitalist Power 
 
The pro-consumption tax literature’s ultimate argument against fairness 
objections (and its second argument for the fairness of a tax exemption for 
the 1%) is that the very idea that the fortunes of billionaires should be taxed, 
as such, is nonsense.  According to Bankman, Weisbach, and Shaviro, even if 
we cannot “get at” Gates’s fortune, we need not concern ourselves since any 
ethical objection to exempting capitalist ownership from tax is not only 
wrong but, as Shaviro puts it, a “non-sequitor.”62  Bankman and Weisbach 
endorse Shaviro’s characterization as “ably” stated.63 
However, Shaviro does not spell out the non-sequitor here and never tells 
us what it is exactly that does not follow from what?  He does say that the 
benefits of capitalist ownership derive only from what one can actually buy 
with capital.  Certainly, reducing the power of capital to expenditure makes 
some sense, if one sees capitalist ownership very abstractly as merely a very 
large pile of cash.  But Shaviro goes further and says that the value of 
ownership reduces entirely to actual expenditures.  According to Shaviro, 
ownership itself, even ownership of an entire nation’s resources by a tiny 
oligarchy, confers no benefit as such, and is as worthless as (in Shaviro’s 
Orwellian phrase64) “Monopoly money.”65  From this characterization of 
capitalist power, it is easy to see how Bankman, Shaviro, and Weisbach can 
conclude that exempting capital accumulation from tax and only taxing 
expenditures fully captures the full benefit of capital to the capitalist.  By 
denying that capital ownership as such confers any power or benefit to the 
capitalist, they claim to have met the fairness objection that a consumption 
tax would be a windfall to the 1%.  Indeed, they claim to have rendered it 
nonsense. 
 Shaviro sets up his argument as a response to his colleagues Liam 
Murphy and Thomas Nagel in the philosophy department at New York 
University, who were contributing to the tax scholarship as—so to speak—
the resident experts on distributive justice.  Adding Murphy and Nagel to the 
debate on the fairness of the consumption tax reflects the hope among many 
tax scholars that interdisciplinary work in tax policy would improve our 
understanding of distributive justice issues in tax law.  It reflects the 
endorsement of “division of labor under which legal tax scholars confine 
                                                
 62. See Shaviro, supra note 34, at 48. 
 63. Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 33, at 1449. 
 64. After all, the game of Monopoly is itself a satire on the absurdities and abuses of 
capitalist power and control.  The term “monopoly” obviously also denotes typical abuse of 
capitalist power.  It is Orwellian to use “monopoly” as a metaphor in denying the existence of 
capitalist power and control. 
 65. Shaviro, supra note 34, at 44, 47–48. 
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themselves to the nuts and bolts of the system and leave it to those in the 
humanities and social sciences to provide insight into the larger political 
issues.”66  Furthermore, as Rawls and the “Rawls industry” (recall that Nagel 
himself was a student of Rawls) so dominates the American academic 
discourse on distributive justice and fairness, more often Rawlsian analysis 
does the heavy lifting on distributive justice and “larger political issues.”  
Obviously, from a Geussian realist perspective, using Rawlsian style analysis 
to gain insight into the injustice or justice of real systems of power is a cure 
worse than the disease.  As Geuss might put it, using “highly abstractive 
methods in political philosophy” to evaluate distributive justice issues will 
only “generalize one’s own local prejudices and repackage them as demands 
of reason.”67  This Part shows that this is exactly what happens when Murphy 
and Nagel contribute to the consumption tax debate.  Rather than 
supplementing Bankman’s, Shaviro’s, and Weisbach’s work with historically 
informed insights into the distributive injustices created and perpetuated by 
capitalist ownership and control of America, Murphy and Nagel end up only 
reifying America’s particular system of economic and social power as the 
best of all possible worlds.68 
Accordingly, Murphy and Nagel’s defense of fairness objections to 
exempting capital from taxation is rather weak.  They write:  
 
[I]t should be obvious that wealth is an independent source 
of welfare, quite apart from the fact that some of it may be 
consumed later.  As Henry Simons famously put it, in 1938, 
“In a world where capital accumulation proceeds as it does 
now, there is something sadly inadequate about the idea of 
saving as postponed consumption.”  Commentators typically 
mention such factors as security, political power, and social 
standing.69 
                                                
 66. Joseph Bankman, The Politics of the Income Tax, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1684, 1685 (1994). 
 67. GEUSS, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
 68. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 181 (writing that the market system is “the best 
method we have for creating employment, generating wealth, allocating capital to production, 
and distributing goods and services”).  Murphy and Nagel might resist this characterization of 
their work, pointing to its central claim that “the idea of a nongovernmental market world that 
could be used as a baseline for fairness in government economic policy . . . [remains] . . . a 
fantasy.”  Id. at 108.  As the discussion herein indicates, however, Murphy and Nagel end up 
endorsing the abstraction of a “capitalist market economy[,]” thereby effectively endorsing the 
superiority of our current system as a matter of course and without much independent 
justification.  For a more comprehensive evaluation and critique of Murphy and Nagel’s work, 
see Patrick Crawford, Book Review: The Myth of Ownership (Myths within Myths), LAWCRIT 
(forthcoming 2014), http://lawcrit.com/. 
 69. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 114 (citations omitted).  In fact, this 
naturalization and praise of capitalist systems of power is very common in interdisciplinary 
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It is rather striking that Murphy and Nagel do not flesh out exactly why 
commentators such as Simons worried about capitalist power.  In fact, what 
                                                                                                               
work in tax policy.  Bruce Ackerman and Ann Alstott’s book, The Stakeholder Society, is 
another example.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANN ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 
(1999).  In this work, Ackerman and Alstott practically bend over backwards to reassure their 
readers that they are not advocating any real change to the existing socio-economic order.  
“Through stakeholding,” they write, “ [o]ur initiative does not seek to reverse world economic 
forces.  It fully endorses the open economy.”  Id. at 14.  Ackerman and Alstott propose giving 
each citizen a one-time grant of $80,000 in early adulthood to be financed by an annual 2% 
wealth tax.  Id.  The justification for this redistribution is purely equality of opportunity to 
participate as “stakeholders” in the “free enterprise system.”  Id.  Ackerman and Alstott are 
“interested in opportunities, not outcomes.”  Id. at 24.  They seem to think that such a thing as 
the “free market” actually exists and they seem to view it rather quaintly as a system of “social 
cooperation.”  Id. at 14.  Their description of American capitalism is very abstract and lacking 
any historical context or description.  They view the system as an open space where 
individuals are free to make their own decisions and where regulatory capture, labor 
exploitation, and class conflict do not exist.  As they put it:  
[T]he free enterprise system did not drop from thin air.  It has emerged 
only as the result of a complex and ongoing scheme of social cooperation.  
The free market requires heavy public expenditures on the police and the 
courts and much else.  Besides, without billions of voluntary decisions by 
Americans to respect the rights of property in their daily lives, the system 
would collapse.  All Americans benefit from this cooperative activity—but 
some much more than others.  
Id.  One might ask whether Ackerman and Alstott would also insist that all slaves benefited 
from the “cooperative activity” of slavetrading?  Ackerman and Alstott even come close to 
virtually ignoring exploitation and issues of inequality by describing the “worldwide division 
of labor” exclusively as “bestowing great wealth.”  Id. at 7.  Ackerman and Alstott do 
acknowlege that “Our vision of economic citizenship is rooted in the classical liberal tradition.  
It is up to each citizen—not the government—to decide how she will use her fair share of the 
nation’s patrimony.”  Id. at 3.  From the perspective of critical theory, of course, such 
liberalism (used in this way) is nothing more than the ideology of capitalism.  It assumes that 
the capitalist system is not heavily dependent on a nanny state itself.  The salient point here, 
however, is simply that their view of the world does not go far enough in ascertaining the 
reality of the socio-economic system and is thus incapable of evaluating its equity or 
suggesting real alternatives.  In contrast to their approach, the work of Gar Alperovitz is a 
good example of the type of political theory that would be more consistent with the realist 
approach advocated in this paper.  As Alperovitz writes:  
Some Liberals continue to hope against hope that somehow a revival of 
progressive politics can one day reverse the decaying trend.  But clearly, if 
serious after-the-fact redistributive measures are no longer viable, 
something much more fundamental is needed. . . . [I]f change is ever to 
occur, an assault must ultimately be made on the underlying relationships 
that have produced the inequality trends in the first place—especially 
those involving ownership and control of the nation’s wealth.  
GAR ALPEROVITZ, AMERICA BEYOND CAPITALISM: RECLAIMING OUR WEALTH, OUR LIBERTY, 
AND OUR DEMOCRACY 19 (2011).  
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Simons actually said about capitalist power seems far more critical and far 
more historically grounded and realist than anything Murphy and Nagel 
would say.  Thus, there is some irony in Murphy and Nagel’s deployment of 
Simon against the pro-consumption tax position.  This is because while 
Simons was famous for his attack on the corrupting influence of capitalist 
domination and control in contemporary America,70 Murphy and Nagel tend 
to cut the other way, describing our system more abstractly and positively as 
a “capitalist market economy” (read: “the particular system of economic 
power we happen to live under”) which is “the best method we have for 
creating employment, generating wealth, allocating capital to production, and 
distributing goods and services.”71  Even in light of the growing inequality 
and social dislocation and despair all around them, Murphy and Nagel 
describe economic reality in highly abstract, ahistorical, and distinctly 
deferential and complimentary terms.  Absent from Murphy and Nagel’s 
analysis is any examination of the historical reality of socio-economic 
conditions in the United States or the dominant force (i.e., capital) that 
creates it.  Written in 1998, their analysis ignores the massive program of 
deregulation (i.e., rent seeking), which resulted in the stark distributional 
trends (i.e., shifting government expenditure away from the public good to 
subsidize private capital) that had occurred from the 1970s on, as had been 
well documented by Chomsky and other competent analysts.72  Murphy and 
Nagel seem to resist the critical implications of their own claim that there is 
no such thing as the free market—that everything is regulated through and 
through.73  For instance, at times they speak as if there is something like a 
                                                
 70. In his essay, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, Simons wrote:  
Eliminate all forms of monopolistic market power, to include the breakup 
of large oligopolistic corporations and application of anti-trust laws to 
labor unions.  A Federal incorporation law could be used to limit 
corporation size and where technology required giant firms for reasons of 
low cost production the Federal government should own and operate them. 
. . . Promote economic stability by reform of the monetary system and 
establishment of stable rules for monetary policy. . . . Reform the tax 
system and promote equity through income tax. . . . Abolish all tariffs . . . . 
Limit waste by restricting advertising and other wasteful merchandising 
practices.   
HENRY C. SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR A 
LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY 40 (Harry D. Gideonse ed., 1934). 
 71. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 181. 
 72. See supra notes 3, 7, and 10 and accompanying text (discussing Chomsky’s work in 
this area). 
 73. As previously mentioned, Murphy and Nagel acknowledge that “the idea of a 
nongovernmental market world that could be used as a baseline for fairness in government 
economic policy . . . [remains] . . . a fantasy.”  MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 108.  If 
only they were as critical of the notion of a “capitalist market economy” as well. 
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“capitalist market economy”—which needs regulations superimposed in 
order to correct for the “large economic and social inequalities . . . [it] 
inevitably generates.”74  But it could be countered that there is no such thing 
as a “capitalist market economy” and that there is no “inevitability” to the 
inequalities “it” creates.  As Simons, or a review by Murphy and Nagel of 
contemporary history, would make clear, inequalities are here by design—the 
intentional result of economic regulation, capitalist rent seeking, and success 
in class struggle.  In fact, some of Murphy and Nagel’s analysis actually 
minimizes the benefits of capitalist domination and control by reminding us 
just how much the poor in fact benefit in such a system!  They all but deny 
class power when they call for a “serious discussion of the general 
phenomenon of social class” but explicitly limit the terms of such a 
discussion to the effect of class standing on an individual’s metric of 
psychological well-being (i.e., whether being in a higher class makes one feel 
better!).75  While minimizing capitalist power and control, Murphy and Nagel 
nevertheless insist on reminding us of the great benefits conferred on the 
poor.  They write, “though the very poor benefit less from government than 
the rich, they still benefit greatly as against the baseline of the war of all 
against all . . . .”76  One might ask whether Murphy and Nagel also think that 
the slaves in America benefitted from the system?  It seems pretty clear that 
Murphy and Nagel’s analysis suffers from the Rawlsian vice of repackaging 
prejudices in favor of the current system as the reasoned conclusions of a 
rigorous and objective justice analysis. 
Thus it is hardly surprising that Murphy and Nagel do not seriously 
challenge Shaviro’s claim that capitalist ownership and control is “Monopoly 
money.”77  Murphy and Nagel pretty much give up any counterargument 
entirely when they themselves seem to reduce capitalist power to an 
expenditure.  As they write, “Wealth leads to political power in the United 
States, since the possibility of significant contribution to a politician’s funds 
encourages special treatment.”78  Just like Shaviro, they reduce the 
phenomenon of capitalist power in America to the dollar amounts capitalists 
happen to contribute to a campaign!  Capitalist power, influence, 
exploitation, and control go well beyond the paltry amount spent on 
campaigns, of course.  But Murphy and Nagel, in effect, deny this and like 
good neo-Rawlsians simply erase historical reality and force themselves to 
remain silent on issues of inequality and distributive justice.  Murphy and 
Nagel simply do not share the common intuition (universal in my estimation 
                                                
 74. Id. at 181.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 18. 
 77. Shaviro, supra note 34, at 44, 47–48. 
 78. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 40, at 115.   
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at OWS) that a surtax on capital would be the least we could do to internalize 
just a tiny fraction of the enormous social costs imposed by self-serving 
capitalist domination, control, and exploitation of our socio-economic 
resources, our politics, and, indeed, of the earth’s very ecology.  In a radical 
understatement of capitalist power, they write, “Whether wealth should be a 
target of taxes for this reason [of undue influence on the system] is doubtful, 
since effective control of campaign financing would seem to be the 
preferable remedy.”79  Unlike OWS or the historically based realist analysis 
advocated in this Article, Murphy and Nagel are actually rejecting a surtax 
on capital as being, in effect, too harsh!80   
With opponents like Murphy and Nagel, it is hardly surprising that 
Shaviro has little trouble dispensing with their objections.  As Shaviro puts it: 
 
Murphy and Nagel are undoubtedly correct that people 
value wealth not only because, while it remains 
unconsumed, it may give them security, political power, and 
social standing. . . . The problem with their raising these 
points in relation to the income versus consumption tax 
choice, however, is that in this setting the points are 
complete non-sequiturs.  
Why does wealth offer security, political power, and 
social standing?  The answer can only be: because of its 
value—that is, because of what it can be used to buy. . . . 
Murphy and Nagel fail to recognize that savings and wealth 
are indeed subsidiary to consumption, in that they derive 
their value entirely from this potential use whether its 
exercise is proximate or not.  This ability to buy things is, 
after all, the difference between real money and Monopoly 
money.   
Accordingly, the argument that a consumption tax fails 
to reach the indirect benefits of wealth-holding, because 
wealth means more than simply the opportunity to consume 
later, must be rejected as a confused non sequitur.  It appears 
to rest on money illusion, or the mistaken belief that a dollar 
has inherent value, rather than being worth what it can buy.   
. . . . 
Wealth is only worth what it can buy; otherwise, it might 
as well be Monopoly money.81 
                                                
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Shaviro, supra note 34, at 44, 47–48. 
2014 DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE  169 
 
As I have already mentioned, it is rather unclear what the non-sequitor is 
here.  Shaviro can assert that the problem of capitalist power and control 
reduces to capitalist expenditure, but he certainly has not shown this.  For 
Shaviro’s claim to hold up, he would also have to show that in a feudal 
society, or in a slave society, the power of ownership could be reduced to 
expenditure.  And this, he would clearly never do.  The only reason, I am 
suggesting, he reduces the power of the 1% in America to the pittance they 
actually spend is because there is ideology at play.  But we should remind 
ourselves that the benefits or ownership are much greater than any actual 
expenditure.  Ownership is really about controlling state power and having 
that state power set up in a way to exploit the general population and the 
social resources and enforce property rights.  The exercise of state power to 
control a slave or a factory worker occurs, as it were, automatically by design 
and neither the slave owner nor the capitalist has to actually spend a dime for 
the privilege.  Contrary to Shaviro, it is perfectly reasonable for, say, a 
participant at OWS to say, “I think capitalist power is the main cause of this 
whole disaster.  I’m worried that a consumption tax will only increase 
capitalist control and exploitation in the system.  I do not see how my being 
gassed or kicked or beaten can be analyzed by merely looking at campaign 
contributions (though that may be a good place to start).  Capitalist power is 
much more than any amount actually spent on consumption and the problem 
of capitalist power is much, much bigger than just campaign finance.  I am 
worried that this reform proposal is just another pro-capitalist “reform.”  
From this perspective it is, to say the least, rather paternalistic and dismissive 
to characterize such concerns as non-sequitors, irrational, or meaningless.  
On the contrary, they highlight precisely the historical reality that Bankman, 
Weisbach, and Shaviro deny: the injustice of unfettered capitalist power in 
contemporary America.  The phenomenon of capitalist power can only be 
appreciated by a historical analysis showing how it really operates.  Even as 
a preliminary matter, it seems obvious that reducing capitalist power to 
expenditure is incorrect.  To reiterate a point made previously, consider the 
claim that the entire system is set up, or rigged, to benefit the capitalist class.  
To benefit from this, the capitalist need not spend a dime.  And we all know 
that the mere threat of exercise of power is enough to extort rents from the 
population.  To crush the labor movement in America, Reagan had to do little 
more than break one air controllers strike.  The returns on this action were 
enormous and the expenditure very slight.  Add to this the impact of media 
control, the role of the educational system and the like and it becomes clear 
that reducing capitalist power to an expenditure is a mistake.  Put yet another 
way, would we accept an analysis that reduced the power and benefits of 
being Michael Corleone to the actual amounts he happens to spend in any 
given year?  
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On the contrary, one would want to tax Corleone as much as possible as 
a penalty for his abuse of power.  In a similar way, we feel compelled to tax 
capital ownership as such on fairness grounds.  The fairness objection to the 
consumption tax supports the argument for a surtax on capital for the cost (to 
the 99%) of doing its business.  Seen in this light, the fairness claim seems 
very modest and reasonable; a surtax on capital is the least we can do to 
check, or penalize, capitalist power.  This is hardly a radical idea.  As 
mentioned, Stiglitz comes pretty close to expressing this very idea, in fact.  
As previously quoted, Stiglitz recently said, “[I]f you could target taxes on 
that kind of rent seeking, you actually generate income and improve 
economic efficiency.  So, to the extent that you can target those kinds of 
rents, you oughta tax that as close to 100% as you can.”82  Indeed, even 
David Bradford, whom Shaviro describes as the “father of modern 
consumption tax philosophy,”83 acknowledged at least the legitimacy of the 
intuition that large accumulations of wealth may “endanger the functioning 
of democracy,” though he described it as “rarely, if ever, supported by 
quantitative reasoning.”84  He continued, “Nor is it clear that the problem is 
controllable at all through taxes.  But if so, one would expect it to be an issue 
only in the case of very large accumulations.”85  Remarkably, Bankman, 
                                                
 82. Institute for New Economic Thinking, A Conversation on the Economy: Stiglitz and 
Krugman on the Financial Crisis and the Future of Economics, THE INST. BLOG (Oct. 26, 
2012), at 1:09, http://ineteconomics.org/blog/inet/conversation-economy-stiglitz- 
and-krugman-financial-crisis-and-future-economics. 
 83. Shaviro, supra note 53. 
 84. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 164 (1999).   
 85. Id.  Bradford’s work is a “Committee for Economic Development Publication.”  The 
Committee for Economic Development (“CED”) is an organization founded, funded, and run 
by big business, and its purpose is to advocate for the self-interest of big business.  See 
Charles Kolb, The American Business Community’s Collective-Action Problem, HUFFINGTON 
POST BUS. (Jan. 6, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kolb/the-
american-business-com_b_1187205.html (urging support of Simpson-Bowls and asking big 
business to support policies opposing the “shake down” of “their organizations . . . by the 
taxpayer-funded professional politicians who dominate our Congress”).  During his career, 
Bradford was affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute (“AEI”) and his work was 
backed by AEI as well as the John M. Olin Foundation (both big business advocacy groups).  
See David Bradford (Economist), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Bradford_ 
%28economist%29 (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (listing AEI as a funding source); see also 
David F. Bradford & Derrick A. Max, Implicit Budget Deficits: The Case of a Mandated Shift 
to Community-Rated Health Insurance, in 11 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 129, available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10907.pdf (noting financial support from the John M. Olin 
Foundation).  He was a member of George H. W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors and 
was on the Advisory Board of the Brookings Institution as well.  His consumption tax work 
was endorsed and promoted by AEI and the Cato Institute.  See, e.g., Alan D. Viard et al., The 
X Tax: The Progressive Consumption Tax America Needs?, AM. ENTER. INST. (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-policy/the-x-tax-the-progressive-consumption-tax-
america-needs/.  Bradford was active in the Cato Institute, being on the advisory board of the 
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Weisbach, and Shaviro seem to move the discussion backwards from even 
the modest claims of the relatively conservative Bradford.  They certainly 
seem far from the moderate Stiglitz.   
Indeed, this moving backwards is itself indicative of the ideological 
character of the consumption tax literature.  This literature exemplifies the 
more general trend of abandoning even the modest historically based 
critiques of capitalist power by the likes of Simon and Bradford.86  The 
problem is not just that the literature seems to the right of Bradford.  Rather, 
it is that the literature operates on a different plane altogether, denying even 
the rationality of objections to the historical reality of capitalist domination 
and control.  In this way, the literature can be characterized, like Rawlsian 
analysis, as primarily ideological in nature, pointing fairness analysis in 
exactly the wrong direction. 
 
C. A Comment on the Pro-Consumption Tax Literature’s Intellectual 
History: Bradford’s Positivism 
 
If one is emphasizing history, it seems appropriate to pay some attention 
to the intellectual history of the consumption tax debate itself.  Accordingly, 
this Part concludes with some comments in this regard.  First, it is worth 
keeping in mind that the pro-consumption tax literature’s intellectual history 
is based on direct and active financial support of corporate and capitalist 
lobby groups such as the American Enterprise Institute and the John M. Olin 
Foundation87—the very type of propaganda intervention in economic and 
legal theory decried by Stiglitz.88  As previously mentioned, Bradford, the 
philosopher for the pro-consumption tax scholarship, at least recognized the 
legitimacy of the fairness objection to not taxing large capital 
accumulations.89  Bradford’s way of dispensing with this fairness objection 
was different than Shaviro’s, however.  Bradford recognized that people 
                                                                                                               
institution’s publication Regulation. Bradford supported what he called “the X-tax,” a “better-
designed version [of the Hall-Rabushka flat tax] that could be more progressive than the flat 
tax, if desired . . . .”  See Shaviro, supra note 53. 
 86. Unfortunately, very extreme forms of economic analysis have come to dominate 
distributive justice analysis in the tax schlarship.  Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have even 
offered a formal proof that claims to show that economic analysis of a particularly ahistorical 
and derivative variety is the only legitimate way of evaluating any fairness argument in any 
area of law.  See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006).  For 
a critique of this project (as well as the scholarship in the book), see Patrick Crawford, Kaplow 
and Shavel’s Imperialism: Debunking Fairness Versus Welfare, LAWCRIT (forthcoming 2014), 
http://lawcrit.com/. 
 87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 88. See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 44–45. 
 89. See Shaviro, supra note 53. 
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make such fairness claims—and he recognized fairness “intuitions” as 
legitimate.  Bradford did not take up such objections, however, because they 
could not be determined with scientific certainty.  In Bradford’s positivism, 
value judgments are not given serious weight because they cannot be 
quantified.  As Bradford writes: 
 
It is tempting to argue that having twice as much income 
makes one twice well off, and therefore at least twice as able 
to bear taxes.  But such a view really expresses no more than 
that the observer believes it. . . . The extra utility generated 
by adding a bit of cake to an individual’s consumption is 
asserted to be smaller the larger is the individual’s amount to 
begin with. . . . Economics has long since recognized that 
there is no observable quantity called utility.  Indeed, the 
only meaning one could give to the idea in this context 
would be as a measure to reflect the particular distributional 
views of the observer.  If I say the extra utility Jane gets 
from an extra dollar exceeds the extra utility Dick gets from 
an extra dollar, I am saying nothing more than I would 
regard the result of giving an extra dollar to Jane as better 
than that of giving an extra dollar to Dick.90 
 
Putting aside the irony of the Marie Antoinette metaphor (which is 
astonishingly similar in its unintended irony to Shaviro’s Orwellian 
Monopoly metaphor), the vulgar positivism is clear.  Bradford is saying that 
distributional justice claims have little or no rational force and are just as up 
for grabs as my preference for cake.  This sort of positivism in the social 
sciences has been famously criticized in the very tradition of critical theory 
upon which the ideology critique in this Article relies.91  Suffice it to say, 
Bradford is quite selective about which “value judgments” he thinks have 
standing (i.e., those that support a move to a consumption tax) and which do 
not (i.e., those that oppose a move to a consumption tax).  Thus, Bradford 
wrings his hands over the injustice of taxing differently those with “exactly 
the same opportunities . . .” (i.e., taxing savers more than spenders).92  But he 
apparently thinks it is impossible to evaluate the fairness of Marie 
Antoinette’s suggestion that the peasants eat cake.  The point here is simply 
that there appears to be a tradition of dismissing distributive justice concerns 
                                                
 90. BRADFORD, supra note 84, at 386, 152–53. 
 91. The critique of such positivism in the social sciences was an integral part of the 
philosophical tradition of critical theory.  See generally CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 19 
(evaluating the Frankfurt School’s “critical theory”). 
 92. See BRADFORD, supra note 84, at 165.   
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in the consumption tax literature.  In fact, Bankman, Shaviro, and Weisbach 
go even further than Bradford and dismiss fairness objections as non-
sequitors.  After all, Bradford at least acknowledges the legitimacy of the 
fairness objection to his program.  Indeed, he takes them so seriously that he 
sees it necessary to “extensively discuss” them.93  While his “extensive 
discussion” seems little more than a dismissal, at least he was writing in an 
intellectual environment where we felt compelled to at least try. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article argues that, contrary to Joseph Bankman’s hope in 1997, the 
present focus of tax scholarship may in fact be “necessarily bad.”94  This is 
because the econometric-analysis-supplemented-with-liberal-social-theory 
formula obscures rather than illuminates the historical reality of power 
necessary to evaluate the justice of economic regulation.  In the same way 
that Rawlsian theories of justice allow us to pretend to talk about justice 
while ignoring historical reality and the injustices all around us, the ideology 
of American scholarship on economic regulation makes it almost impossible 
to adequately address fairness concerns.  This Article’s ideology critique of 
the consumption tax literature demonstrates how ideology operates in legal 
scholarship to obscure distributive justice issues.  What holds for the 
consumption tax debate, one would surely bet, holds for most of the legal 
scholarship on economic regulation over the past thirty-odd years.  The past 
thirty-odd years have made clear that ignoring historical developments such 
as capitalist rent seeking and regulatory capture can contribute to severe 
declines in social welfare.  Moving away from both abstract econometric 
analysis and Rawlsian-type approaches to distributive justice will be 
important if the legal scholarship on economic regulation wishes to establish 
itself as a constructive player in the public discourse to improve our laws and 
regulations for the benefit of the general welfare.  This Article’s ideology 
                                                
 93. Id. 
 94. As Bankman wrote:  
The present focus of legal scholarship [in tax] is not necessarily bad.  The 
tax law is enormously complicated, and inconsistencies within the law 
that are not brought to light can cost the fisc billions of dollars and distort 
behavior in ways that are undesirable under any political theory.  
Moreover, by focusing with increasing economic sophistication on the 
operation of the tax law, legal tax scholars are doing what they do best.  
One might therefore applaud a division of labor under which legal tax 
scholars confine themselves to the nuts and bolts of the system and leave 
it to those in the humanities and social sciences to provide insight into 
the larger political issues.  
Bankman, supra note 66, at 1684. 
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critique is meant to identify what this would take and encourage legal 
scholars to critically reflect on their own role in the current crisis of 
inequality and broad-based disenfranchisement. 
